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JAIL ISOLATION AFTER KINGSLEY:
ABOLISHING SOLITARY CONFINEMENT
AT THE INTERSECTION
OF PRETRIAL INCARCERATION
AND EMERGING ADULTHOOD
Deema Nagib*
In 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court held that allegations of excessive use of
force in pretrial detention are subject to an objective standard. However, it
is unclear whether the objective standard extends to claims arising out of
different factual circumstances. The Second Circuit’s recent decision in
Darnell v. Pineiro to extend Kingsley v. Hendrickson to conditions-ofconfinement cases provides hope. This Note argues that Kingsley should
extend to solitary confinement litigation—particularly the isolation of
emerging adults in pretrial detention. Solitary confinement is a widespread
practice in the criminal justice system, but the implications of its use in
pretrial detention have not been fully explored. Since its inception, solitary
confinement has demonstrated adverse psychological and physiological
effects. Emerging adults are most likely to be exposed to the practice and
are more vulnerable to its effects. Incarcerated emerging adults who are
held awaiting trial already experience a significant disruption in their social
and emotional development.
This Note draws from psychological
scholarship, arguing that isolating emerging adults in pretrial detention
causes irreparable harm to their well-being—harm so severe that it amounts
to unconstitutional punishment. Finally, this Note proposes a solution to this
mass problem: abolishing solitary confinement for emerging adults who are
incarcerated pretrial.

* J.D. Candidate, 2018, Fordham University School of Law; B.S., Applied Psychology, 2014,
New York University. I would like to thank Professor Michael W. Martin for his guidance
throughout this process. I would also like to thank the Fordham Law Review editors and staff
for all of their help. Finally, I would like to dedicate this Note to everyone who is currently
or formerly incarcerated. I constantly strive to be a better listener first and advocate second.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you are locked in a six-by-eight-foot cell for close to twentythree hours per day—for days, weeks, or months.1 When you wake up, you
see a toilet.2 Your cellmates are roaches and rodents, and the noise is
incessant.3 Late at night, people yell.4 There is little to no natural light.5 It

1. See Trey Bundy, Sixteen, Alone, 23 Hours a Day, in a Six-by-Eight-Foot Box, MEDIUM
(Mar. 5, 2014), https://medium.com/solitary-lives/sixteen-alone-23-hours-a-day-in-a-six-byeight-foot-box-26ab1e09632d#.4hst619c0 [http://perma.cc/69RV-NWB8].
2. See Dana Goldstein et al., This Is Rikers: From the People Who Live and Work There,
MARSHALL PROJECT (June 28, 2015, 9:00 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/06/
28/this-is-rikers [http://perma.cc/DHG3-RVFT].
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. N.Y.C. JAILS ACTION COAL., PETITION TO THE NEW YORK CITY BOARD OF CORRECTION
FOR ADOPTION OF RULES REGARDING THE USE OF ISOLATED CONFINEMENT 18 (2013),
http://nycjac.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/JAC-Petition-to-BOC-for-Rule-Making-andReform-of-Solitary-Confinement-2013.pdf [http://perma.cc/J396-GLKS].
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smells of “body odor and human waste.”6 You must be escorted anytime you
wish to leave your cell.7 To add to the distress, imagine you are between the
ages of eighteen and twenty-five and have not been convicted of a crime.
Throughout all of this you feel hopeless, lonely, and depressed.8 Maybe
you think about committing suicide.9 Maybe you attempt suicide.10 This is
solitary confinement.
Isolation alone is enough to cause a person to deteriorate mentally,
emotionally, and physically.11 Isolation during a critical phase of
development and an especially traumatic phase of the criminal justice process
can further this deterioration.12
In 1971, Richard G. Singer wrote:
It seems remarkable that, in this the last third of the twentieth century,
we still send men to small dank closets, deprive them of human
companionship, sanitary needs, and clothing, feed them on a starvation diet,
force them to sleep on thin mattresses, and then, after an unspecified period,
remove them from this environment and proceed in the hope that they have
been “rehabilitated.”13

In the beginning of the twenty-first century, this practice is still
widespread.14 The long-lasting, detrimental effects of solitary confinement
are well documented.15 Solitary confinement as a penal practice was
scrutinized by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture,16 President

6. Id.
7. Id. at 17–18.
8. Id.
9. See id. at 18.
10. See Jennifer Gonnerman, Kalief Browder Learned How to Commit Suicide on Rikers,
NEW YORKER (June 2, 2016), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/kalief-browderlearned-how-to-commit-suicide-on-rikers [http://perma.cc/KQP7-3H6W].
11. See infra Part I.B.
12. See generally Jessica Lee, Note, Lonely Too Long: Redefining and Reforming
Juvenile Solitary Confinement, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 845 (2016) (arguing that individuals
between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five should be included in the broader push to
eliminate or limit juvenile solitary confinement in the prison system).
13. Richard G. Singer, Confining Solitary Confinement: Constitutional Arguments for a
“New Penology,” 56 IOWA L. REV. 1251, 1251 (1971).
14. ALLEN J. BECK, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, USE OF RESTRICTIVE HOUSING IN U.S. PRISONS
AND JAILS, 2011–12, at 4 (2015), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/urhuspj1112.pdf
(showing that approximately 18 percent of people incarcerated in jails and 20 percent of people
incarcerated in prisons spent time in solitary confinement in a twelve-month period or since
their arrival at the facility) [http://perma.cc/U9AP-WAHX].
15. See infra Part I.B.
16. See Juan E. Méndez (Special Rapporteur on Torture), Interim Rep. of the Special
Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, ¶¶ 79–81, U.N. Doc. A/66/268 (Aug. 5, 2011) (“The Special
Rapporteur stresses that solitary confinement is a harsh measure which may cause serious
psychological and physiological adverse effects on individuals.”); see also G.A. Res. 70/175,
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (Nelson Mandela Rules), at 17 (Jan.
8, 2016) (“Solitary confinement shall be used only in exceptional cases as a last resort, for as
short a time as possible . . . .”).
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Obama,17 and the U.S. Supreme Court.18 Regrettably, the use of solitary
confinement in local jails across the United States has not been similarly
critiqued.19
Jails represent an important stage in the criminal justice system: the first
point of exposure to incarceration.20 Despite their importance, they have
“remained largely under the radar of researchers and policy analysts alike.”21
Isolation during pretrial incarceration is “likely to significantly compound
and worsen the already painful psychological transition from the freeworld
to penal confinement.”22
The traumatic combination of isolation and pretrial incarceration is even
worse during emerging adulthood. The vocal movement to abolish solitary
confinement in prisons and jails for youth has largely focused on juveniles
under the age of eighteen.23 However, research demonstrates that
designating the age of eighteen as a marker of legal adulthood is largely
arbitrary.24 Development exists on a continuum, and people continue to
develop through their midtwenties.25
Emerging adulthood, a critical developmental phase, is especially
important in the critique of solitary confinement during pretrial
incarceration.26 Incarcerated emerging adults represent “‘the perfect storm’
of the potential perils of this developmental period.”27 Notably, people
between the ages of eighteen and twenty-four are most likely to spend time
17. See Peter Baker, Obama Calls for Effort to Fix a ‘Broken System’ of Criminal Justice,
N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/15/us/politics/obama-calls-foreffort-to-fix-a-broken-system-of-criminal-justice.html [http://perma.cc/X4GR-PFYY].
18. See, e.g., Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2208–09 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(addressing an issue that had no bearing on the legal question before the Court to emphasize
the “human toll” of solitary confinement); see also Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685 (1978)
(“Confinement in . . . an isolation cell is a form of punishment subject to scrutiny under Eighth
Amendment standards.”).
19. See Craig Haney et al., Examining Jail Isolation: What We Don’t Know Can Be
Profoundly Harmful, 96 PRISON J. 126, 134 (2015) (reporting that there is an “absence of
reliable data about exactly how often jail isolation is used, for how long, and with what
effect”).
20. Id. at 131 (referring to jails as “first responder” correctional facilities in the criminal
justice system).
21. Loïc Wacquant, Class, Race & Hyperincarceration in Revanchist America, 139
DAEDALUS 74, 75 (2010).
22. Haney et al., supra note 19, at 143.
23. See Tamar R. Birckhead, Children in Isolation: The Solitary Confinement of Youth,
50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1 (2015); Anthony Giannetti, Note, The Solitary Confinement of
Juveniles in Adult Jails and Prisons: A Cruel and Unusual Punishment?, 30 BUFF. PUB. INT.
L.J. 31 (2012). But see Lee, supra note 12 (explaining the effects of solitary confinement on
incarcerated emerging adults in prisons).
24. See infra Part I.C.
25. See Barbara L. Atwell, Rethinking the Childhood-Adult Divide: Meeting the Mental
Health Needs of Emerging Adults, 25 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1, 15 (2015).
26. The Jails Action Coalition, a New York City-based advocacy group, advocated for the
exclusion of emerging adults from solitary confinement because of the population’s
heightened vulnerability to the practice. See N.Y.C. JAILS ACTION COAL., supra note 5, at 16.
27. Kristyn Zajac et al., Juvenile Justice, Mental Health, and the Transition to Adulthood:
A Review of Service System Involvement and Unmet Needs in the U.S., 56 CHILD. & YOUTH
SERVICES REV. 139, 140 (2015).
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in solitary confinement while incarcerated in local jails.28 Given the unique
vulnerabilities of emerging adults,29 the practice of solitary confinement is
likely to be ineffective in disciplining individuals and maintaining safety, and
it simultaneously exacerbates detrimental health effects.30
New York City has officially eliminated the use of pretrial solitary
confinement—or “punitive segregation”—for individuals under the age of
twenty-one.31 While this is a welcome improvement, there is already fear
that the New York City Department of Correction is beginning to replace the
practice with ad hoc solitary confinement units and new, equally restrictive
conditions.32 In addition, ending the practice for individuals under the age
of twenty-one does not encompass the rest of the population most vulnerable
to its use.33
The Supreme Court has repeatedly confirmed that people who are
incarcerated pretrial34 receive a different level of constitutional protection
than people who have been convicted.35 Under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, people who are incarcerated pretrial have a substantive due
process right to be free from punishment.36 Under the Eighth Amendment,
28. See BECK, supra note 14, at 4 (showing that 24.8 percent of those between the ages of
eighteen and nineteen and 23.4 percent of those between the ages of twenty and twenty-four
spent time in a restricted housing unit between 2011 and 2012).
29. See infra Part I.C.
30. See infra Part I.B.
31. See Irene Plagianos, Solitary Confinement for Prisoners Under 21 Scrapped in New
York City, DNAINFO (Oct. 12, 2016, 9:19 AM), https://www.dnainfo.com/newyork/20161012/civic-center/punitive-segregation-solitary-confinement-ends-teens-youngpeople (“New York has become the first city in the nation to end solitary confinement for all
inmates under the age of 21.”) [http://perma.cc/L4B9-TVWT].
32. See, e.g., Letter Regarding Notice of Violation of Minimum Standards at West Facility
from Stanley Brezenoff, Chair, N.Y.C. Bd. of Corr., to Joseph Ponte, Comm’r, N.Y.C.
Dep’t of Corr. (Sept. 29, 2016), http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/boc/downloads/pdf/
News/2016.09.29%20-%20Letters%20from%20BOC%20to%20DOC%20re%20West%20
Facility%20Violations.pdf (finding that an ad hoc solitary confinement unit, West Facility,
was in operation and that people were sent there without any due process)
[http://perma.cc/V4KB-UDJ2]; see also Erin Corbett, New York Corrections Head Defends
Chaining Rikers Inmates to Desks for 7 Hours a Day, RAW STORY (Jan. 18, 2017, 6:30 PM),
https://www.rawstory.com/2017/01/new-york-corrections-head-defends-chaining-rikersinmates-to-desks-for-7-hours-a-day/ (reporting that after young adults were barred from
punitive segregation on Rikers Island, administrators approved a practice of shackling them
by their ankles and chaining them to desks for the seven hours that they are entitled to be
outside of their cells) [http://perma.cc/CY6Y-DW8Y].
33. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
34. Person-first language is used throughout this Note rather than “prisoner,” “inmate,” or
“detainee.” To the extent that such words are used, they are in direct quotes. For more
information about person-first language, see Eddie Ellis, An Open Letter to Our Friends on
the Question of Language, CTR. FOR NULEADERSHIP ON URB. SOLUTIONS (Nov.
2013),
http://centerfornuleadership.org/cnus/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/CNUS-lang-ltr_
regular.pdf [http://perma.cc/PLH4-2B82].
35. See Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2473–74 (2015) (holding that claims
brought by people incarcerated pretrial are subject to an objective standard); Sandin v. Conner,
515 U.S. 472, 484–85 (1995) (dismissing a convicted person’s claim that he is entitled to the
same liberty protections as people who are incarcerated pretrial); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.
520, 535–36 (1979) (holding that people incarcerated pretrial have a substantive due process
right to be free from punishment).
36. See infra Part II.B.
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people who are incarcerated following a conviction have a right to be free
from cruel and unusual punishment.37 Despite the shared experience of
incarceration, it is logical to differentiate between the legal rights of those
who have been convicted from those who are languishing in local jails despite
their legally presumed innocence.38
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence has been murky,39 and many circuit
courts have historically applied the Eighth Amendment to claims brought by
people incarcerated pretrial.40 In Kingsley v. Hendrickson,41 the Supreme
Court held that the standard for excessive use of force in pretrial detention is
objective.42 This holding provides room to argue that an objective standard
should extend to other factual circumstances.43 In fact, the Second Circuit
recently held that Kingsley’s objective standard applies to conditions-ofconfinement claims.44 As the issue percolates through the circuits, a risk still
remains that other courts will analyze claims that fall outside the factual
contours of Kingsley under the Eighth Amendment.45
This Note, echoing much of the Second Circuit’s recent opinion, argues
that courts should extend Kingsley’s holding to emerging adults’ exposure to
solitary confinement in pretrial detention. Specifically, this Note argues that
the intersection of pretrial incarceration, solitary confinement, and emerging
adulthood is uniquely dangerous. Part I addresses and explains each factor
of this intersection. Then, Part II explains the Supreme Court cases that
delineate the rights afforded to people who are incarcerated. Finally, Part III
offers a solution to reducing the harmful effects of pretrial incarceration
during emerging adulthood: abolishing solitary confinement. It argues
further that subjecting emerging adults to solitary confinement during pretrial
incarceration is unconstitutional punishment that is objectively unreasonable
and excessive in relation to its stated governmental purpose.
I. BACKGROUND:
A DANGEROUS CONVERGENCE OF FACTORS
The combination of pretrial detention and emerging adulthood presents a
unique challenge to the practice of solitary confinement. Before delving into

37. See infra Part II.A.
38. The author does not intend to justify, by virtue of their conviction, the use of solitary
confinement for people who have been convicted of a crime. This Note’s purpose is simply
to respond to a newly created opportunity to advocate for its abolition in a particular context.
39. See generally Catherine T. Struve, The Conditions of Pretrial Detention, 161 U. PA.
L. REV. 1009 (2013).
40. See infra Part II.C.
41. 135 S. Ct. 2466 (2015).
42. Id. at 2472.
43. See infra Part III.
44. Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 30 (2d Cir. 2017).
45. See, e.g., Kyla Magun, Note, A Changing Landscape for Pretrial Detainees?: The
Potential Impact of Kingsley v. Hendrickson on Jail-Suicide Litigation, 116 COLUM. L. REV.
2059, 2083–84 (2016) (responding to the confusion over whether Kingsley was actually
intended to apply to other claims and arguing that Kingsley’s holding should extend to jail
suicide litigation).
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the constitutional rights afforded to individuals incarcerated pretrial, this part
explains each component of this dangerous convergence in more detail.
A. Jails Matter:
Pretrial Incarceration as an Entry Point
Jails and prisons are often conflated.46 Both prisons and jails incarcerate
people, but they are distinct entities. First, jails are primarily locally funded
and operated.47 As such, they are “subject to local political agendas.”48 The
local nature of jails’ operation also suggests that a wide variety of
institutional practices exist across the country and uniformity is unlikely.49
Second, given the “transience of the jail population,”50 jails incarcerate a
significant number of people per year. In 2015, approximately 10.9 million
people were admitted to local jails across the country and approximately
721,300 were housed in jails per day.51 On average, jails admit
approximately 12 million people per year52 and hold approximately 731,000
individuals per day.53 Prisons, by contrast, hold approximately twice the
number of people as jails on a given day,54 but they admit significantly fewer
per year.55 Not surprisingly, jails have a much larger impact on society than
prisons do.56
46. See, e.g., RAM SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, INCARCERATION’S FRONT
DOOR: THE MISUSE OF JAILS IN AMERICA 4 (2015), https://storage.googleapis.com/vera-webassets/downloads/Publications/incarcerations-front-door-the-misuse-of-jails-in-america/
legacy_downloads/incarcerations-front-door-report_02.pdf [http://perma.cc/K8FK-YKRL].
47. See Jeanne B. Stinchcomb et al., Moving Toward Utopia: Visions of Progress for
American Jails, 28 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 23, 30 (2012); see also AMANDA PETTERUTI &
NASTASSIA WALSH, JUSTICE POLICY INST., JAILING COMMUNITIES: THE IMPACT OF JAIL
EXPANSION AND EFFECTIVE PUBLIC SAFETY STRATEGIES 5 (2008), http://
www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/08-04_rep_jailingcommunities_ac.pdf (“Jails are
correctional facilities operated and funded by counties and localities, and they are usually
centrally located in a community.”) [http://perma.cc/MYP6-WSXZ].
48. Stinchcomb et al., supra note 47, at 30.
49. See Rick Ruddell & G. Larry Mays, Rural Jails: Problematic Inmates, Overcrowded
Cells, and Cash-Strapped Counties, 35 J. CRIM. JUST. 251, 252 (2007) (“Jails within the United
States ranged in size from only four or five beds, to the Los Angeles jail system that housed
an average of 18,693 inmates from October to December 2005.”); see also David C. May et
al., Going to Jail Sucks (and It Really Doesn’t Matter Who You Ask), 39 AM. J. CRIM. JUST.
250, 251 (2013) (“Jail operations vary considerably.”).
50. See Haney et al., supra note 19, at 132.
51. TODD D. MINTON & ZHEN ZENG, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JAIL INMATES IN 2015, at 1
(2016), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ji15.pdf [http://perma.cc/2B2S-5HFG].
52. See Arthur J. Lurigio, Jails in the United States: The “Old-New” Frontier in
American Corrections, 96 PRISON J. 3, 3 (2016); see also SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra note 46,
at 46.
53. SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra note 46, at 4.
54. See, e.g., E. ANN CARSON & ELIZABETH ANDERSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS
IN 2015, at 1 (2016), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p15.pdf (reporting that 1,526,800
people were confined in prisons at the end of 2015) [https://perma.cc/39AC-NW22].
55. See id. at 10 (reporting that 608,300 people were admitted to prisons in 2015).
56. See PETTERUTI & WALSH, supra note 47, at 15 (“[M]any people reenter the community
from jail every day. . . . As a result, people in jails often have many interactions with the
community around the jail facility, in a way that people held in prisons do not. This has
implications for the health and well-being of the people in the jail as well as of the people in
the community.”); see also Haney et al., supra note 19, at 129 (“[T]he social and psychic
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Third, jails and prisons typically serve different populations. People
incarcerated in state and federal prisons have been convicted of a crime and
are typically serving sentences that are greater than one year.57 People
incarcerated in jails are typically awaiting trial or are serving a sentence of
under one year.58 Most people in jails have been arrested but not convicted
of any crime.59 These individuals are “legally presumed innocent.”60
While pretrial release decisions are supposed to be made based on factors
such as risk of flight and community safety,61 low-risk individuals who are
too poor to afford bail are increasingly likely to remain in jail while high-risk
individuals who can afford bail are more likely to be released.62 The Vera
Institute of Justice found that 54 percent of individuals incarcerated in New
York City jails remained incarcerated “because they could not afford bail of
$2,500 or less.”63
Jails tend to incarcerate vulnerable people. They are “repositor[ies]” of
the mentally ill,64 the poor,65 and communities of color,66 and their conditions
have far-reaching ripple effects. Most people who are incarcerated are
eventually released, and the psychological, social, emotional, and physical
effects of incarceration in general, and solitary confinement in particular,
have implications for society as a whole.67
The Department of Justice found that approximately 18 percent of
individuals who were incarcerated in local jails spent time in solitary

‘footprint’ of conditions and practices in jails is broader if not necessarily deeper than for
prisons.”); Wacquant, supra note 21, at 75 (“[J]ails create more social disruption and family
turmoil . . . than do prisons.”).
57. See PETTERUTI & WALSH, supra note 47, at 5; see also CARSON & ANDERSON, supra
note 54, at 6 (reporting that approximately 97 percent of the prison population in 2015 was
sentenced to more than one year in prison).
58. SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra note 46, at 6.
59. See id. (estimating that approximately three out of five individuals incarcerated in jails
across the United States are incarcerated pretrial).
60. Id. at 4–5.
61. See, e.g., Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (2012); United States v. Salerno,
481 U.S. 739, 742 (1987) (upholding the Bail Reform Act’s provision that individuals charged
with an offense may be held if a judicial officer reasonably believes that it is necessary to
assure appearance at trial or necessary for community safety); see also SUBRAMANIAN ET AL.,
supra note 46, at 4.
62. SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra note 46, at 32.
63. Id.
64. See Linda A. Teplin, The Prevalence of Severe Mental Disorder Among Male Urban
Jail Detainees: Comparison with the Epidemiologic Catchment Area Program, 80 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 663, 663 (1990); see also Jillian Peterson & Kevin Heinz, Understanding Offenders
with Serious Mental Illness in the Criminal Justice System, 42 MITCHELL HAMLINE L. REV.
537, 538 (2016) (explaining that “[t]he Los Angeles County jail system is one of the largest
mental health treatment facilities in the country”). See generally Melissa Kong, Cook County
Jail: A De Facto Hospital for the Mentally Ill, 19 LOY. PUB. INT. L. REP. 141 (2014).
65. See SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra note 46, at 4.
66. See id. at 11; see also PETTERUTI & WALSH, supra note 47, at 4. See generally Jonathan
Oberman & Kendea Johnson, Broken Windows: Restoring Social Order or Damaging and
Depleting New York’s Poor Communities of Color?, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 931 (2016).
67. See Mika’il DeVeaux, The Trauma of the Incarceration Experience, 48 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 257, 264 (2013).
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confinement in a twelve-month period.68 This practice, which has been
described as “criminality at one of its highest levels”69 and “solely punitive[,]
[without] any health or safety justification,”70 deserves increased attention
when individuals who have not been convicted of a crime are at risk of
developing long-lasting detrimental health effects.
B. Solitary Confinement: Creating Madness
Solitary confinement typically consists of isolation in a “windowless cell
[that is] no larger than a typical parking spot”71 for twenty-two to twentyfour hours per day.72 A quintessential characteristic of the practice is
“extreme sensory deprivation.”73 Individuals placed in solitary confinement
are often “allowed little or no opportunity for conversation or interaction with
anyone” in the limited time that they are allowed outside of their cells.74
Initially established as a tool for criminal justice reform,75 solitary
confinement is now used primarily for security purposes.76 Despite judicial
deference to jail and prison administrators,77 research demonstrates that the
practice is more likely to cause long-lasting, sometimes permanent, adverse
health effects than to increase institutional order and security.

68. See BECK, supra note 14, at 4 (reporting that 18.1 percent of people incarcerated in
prisons spent time in solitary confinement in a twelve-month period).
69. Thomas B. Benjamin & Kenneth Lux, Solitary Confinement as Psychological
Punishment, 13 CAL. W. L. REV. 265, 296 (1977).
70. Shira E. Gordon, Note, Solitary Confinement, Public Safety, and Recidivism, 47 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 495, 526 (2014).
71. Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2208 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
72. See, e.g., Cedric Richmond, Toward a More Constitutional Approach to Solitary
Confinement: The Case for Reform, 52 HARV. J. LEGIS. 1, 2 (2015); see also G.A. Res. 70/175,
supra note 16, at 17 (defining solitary confinement as isolation for twenty-two or more hours
per day).
73. Mariam Hinds & John Butler, Solitary Confinement: Can the Courts Get Inmates out
of the Hole?, 11 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 331, 332 (2015).
74. Davis, 135 S. Ct. at 2208 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
75. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 236 (Alan
Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977).
76. See ALISON SHAMES ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, SOLITARY CONFINEMENT:
COMMON MISCONCEPTIONS AND EMERGING SAFE ALTERNATIVES 4 (2015),
http://archive.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/solitary-confinementmisconceptions-safe-alternatives-report.pdf (explaining that solitary confinement is “used by
corrections officials in the United States today, largely as a means to fulfill a prison or jail’s
top priority: the safety of its staff and the incarcerated people under its care”)
[http://perma.cc/L29N-P2GR].
77. See Eric Berger, Individual Rights, Judicial Deference, and Administrative Law
Norms in Constitutional Decision Making, 91 B.U. L. REV. 2029, 2045–47 (2011); see also
Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2474 (2015) (“[A] court must take account of the
legitimate interests in managing a jail, acknowledging as part of the objective reasonableness
analysis that deference to policies and practices needed to maintain order and institutional
security is appropriate.”); Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1928 (2011) (“Courts must be
sensitive to . . . the need for deference to experienced and expert prison administrators faced
with the difficult and dangerous task of housing large numbers of convicted criminals.”);
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84–85 (1987) (“Running a prison is an inordinately difficult
undertaking that requires expertise, planning, and the commitment of resources, all of which
are peculiarly within the province of the legislative and executive branches of government.”).
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1. Justification and Effects on Institutional Violence
Solitary confinement was first introduced to reform criminal
punishment.78 The practice’s proponents were concerned with the barbaric
nature of criminal punishment as a public spectacle.79 In the early nineteenth
century, isolation was “intended to redeem the soul through quiet
contemplation.”80 However, the practice’s justifications have shifted over
time. As one scholar noted, solitary confinement has “changed from an open,
optimistic experiment in social reform into a hidden, secretive place of
punishment and control.”81
Today, jail administrators primarily support the use of solitary
confinement as a security measure. Administrators and officers must be able
to effectively manage their facilities,82 and solitary confinement provides
officers with an easy-to-enforce sanction for the violation of disciplinary
rules.83 Jails cannot refuse admission.84 They house populations that are
transient and often in crisis.85 Thus, correction officers are forced to make
choices about how to care for a variety of individuals who may pose a threat
to institutional safety, often without sufficient time to deliberate.86
Correction officers are, first and foremost, concerned with assaults on staff
and other people who are incarcerated.87 Marc Steier, the director of legal
affairs for the Correction Officers’ Benevolent Association, justified solitary
confinement by explaining that he does not know of another way to deal
78. See FOUCAULT, supra note 75, at 236.
79. See JOSHUA M. PRICE, PRISON AND SOCIAL DEATH 93 (2015) (explaining that examples
of public punishment that used to characterize the criminal justice system are “the stocks, the
pillory, the ducking or cucking stool, public flogging, and transport, . . . hanging and other
forms of public execution”).
80. Id. at 92.
81. Stuart Grassian, Psychiatric Effects of Solitary Confinement, 22 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL’Y 325, 343 (2006).
82. See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979) (“Prison administrators . . . should
be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices
that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain
institutional security.”); see also Turner, 482 U.S. at 89 (justifying judicial deference because
“an inflexible strict scrutiny analysis would seriously hamper [prison officials’] ability to
anticipate security problems and to adopt innovative solutions to the intractable problems of
prison administration”).
83. See generally SCARLET KIM ET AL., N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, BOXED IN: THE TRUE
COST OF EXTREME ISOLATION IN NEW YORK’S PRISONS (2012), https://www.nyclu.org/
sites/default/files/publications/nyclu_boxedin_FINAL.pdf [http://perma.cc/BM84-7UKR].
84. See, e.g., Stinchcomb et al., supra note 47, at 28.
85. See, e.g., Haney et al., supra note 19, at 131.
86. See May et al., supra note 49, at 253 (“In addition to places of violence and idleness,
jail staff are challenged by the broad range of offenders they must supervise.”); see also Haney
et al., supra note 19, at 134 (“[People who are incarcerated in local jails] are an especially
complex and challenging population for jail staff to effectively monitor and control. When
combined with the relative lack of support staff to whom they can turn, the high turnover of
inmates, and the typically very limited range of classification, alternative housing, and
management options at their disposal, there is a high likelihood that jail guards will employ
forceful, punitive responses to inmate conflict and misconduct. Isolation can easily become a
normative response in such environments.”).
87. See, e.g., Wacquant, supra note 21, at 75 (writing that “minimiz[ing] violent
incidents” is a “top priorit[y] of jail wardens”).
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“with people who have assaulted staff 20, 40, 60 times.”88 He believes that
the solution is simple: “[I]f I can’t reach you, I can’t attack you.”89
Isolation, in Steier’s mind, is a regulatory mechanism to ensure that the
most dangerous people do not have access to others.90 However, justifying
solitary confinement as an instrument necessary to reduce levels of
institutional violence is likely “unsubstantiated.”91 First, it is important to
clarify that the use of solitary confinement is not exclusively reserved for
people who pose a serious threat to institutional safety.92 Second, research
suggests that solitary confinement does not decrease levels of institutional
violence. One researcher has found that solitary confinement has no effect
on violence—overall levels of violence in his study neither increased nor
decreased.93 Others have found that solitary confinement actually increases
violence.94 In some instances, isolation will drive people to throw “feces,
urine, and/or semen” at officers.95 Isolation can also lead to “uncontrollable
outbursts of anger, rage and aggression.”96 The penal response to such
behavior is more time in solitary confinement, creating a feedback loop
where institutionally unacceptable conduct is met with a sanction that tends
to increase the likelihood that the conduct will recur.97
2. Effects of Solitary Confinement
The potential harmful effects of solitary confinement were known as early
as 1890.98 In In re Medley,99 the Supreme Court found that, while in solitary
confinement,
[a] considerable number of the prisoners fell, after even a short
confinement, into a semi-fatuous condition, from which it was next to
impossible to arouse them, and others became violently insane; others still,
committed suicide; while those who stood the ordeal better were not

88. Victoria Law, Four Deadline Extensions Later, Teenagers Are Still Locked Up in
Solitary on Rikers Island, VILLAGE VOICE (July 13, 2016, 10:00 AM), http://
www.villagevoice.com/news/four-deadline-extensions-later-teenagers-are-still-locked-up-insolitary-on-rikers-island-8856237 [http://perma.cc/W574-7MKG].
89. Id.
90. See id.
91. See SHAMES ET AL., supra note 76, at 18 (“Colorado has decreased its use of segregated
housing by 85 percent and prisoner-on-staff assaults are the lowest they have been since
2006.”); see also N.Y.C. JAILS ACTION COAL., supra note 5, at 16 (“Punitive segregation
fosters violence in DOC facilities and exacerbates threats to institutional security.”).
92. See SHAMES ET AL., supra note 76, at 12–14.
93. Chad S. Briggs et al., The Effect of Supermaximum Security Prisons on Aggregate
Levels of Institutional Violence, 41 CRIMINOLOGY 1341, 1367–70 (2003).
94. See SHAMES ET AL., supra note 76, at 18; see also Grant Henderson, Comment,
Disciplinary Segregation: How the Punitive Solitary Confinement Policy in Federal Prisons
Violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment in Spite of Sandin v. Conner, 99
MARQ. L. REV. 477, 497–99 (2015).
95. Lindley A. Bassett, Note, The Constitutionality of Solitary Confinement: Insights
from Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs, 26 HEALTH MATRIX 403, 417 (2016).
96. See KIM ET AL., supra note 83, at 44.
97. Id.
98. In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 160 (1890).
99. 134 U.S. 160 (1890).
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generally reformed, and in most cases did not recover sufficient mental
activity to be of any subsequent service to the community.100

Dr. Stuart Grassian, an expert on the effects of solitary confinement,
addressed and rebuked concerns that the self-reports typically characterizing
solitary confinement research might be exaggerated.101 He found that his
interviewees actually rationalized and avoided full engagement with the
extent of the deprivation they were facing until he probed further.102 For
example, he reported that one of his interviewees rationalized his self-harm
while in solitary confinement with a desire to leave.103
Grassian found a pattern of initial denial and rationalization, progressing
to overt anxiety once subjects were pressed through questioning.104 Some of
the interviewees expressed fear that the guards would exploit their
weaknesses or that they were, in fact, “going insane.”105 This research
suggests that interviewees’ potential biases typically point toward a lack of
acknowledgment of the practice’s effects as opposed to exaggeration.
In his studies, Grassian identified a distinct psychiatric syndrome
associated with solitary confinement, explaining that many of the associated
symptoms are either rare or not found elsewhere.106 In his evaluation of
forty-nine individuals incarcerated in Pelican Bay State Prison’s solitary
confinement unit, he found that “at least seventeen were actively psychotic
and/or acutely suicidal . . . , and twenty-three others suffered serious
psychopathological reactions to solitary confinement.”107 The most severely
affected by solitary confinement often suffer from delirium, hallucinations,
and disorientation.108 In these mental states, individuals often dissociate and
cannot recall what occurred.109
Among the more resilient in Grassian’s sample—whom he described as
highly educated and high functioning—he found symptoms of “perceptual
Grassian
disturbances, free-floating anxiety, and panic attacks.”110
concluded that the conditions inherent in solitary confinement “are strikingly
toxic to mental functioning, producing a stuporous condition associated with
perceptual and cognitive impairment and affective disturbances.”111
A study conducted in Denmark demonstrated that individuals placed in
solitary confinement experienced significantly higher incidences of

100. Id. at 168.
101. Stuart Grassian, Psychopathological Effects of Solitary Confinement, 140 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 1450, 1451 (1983).
102. Id.
103. Id. (quoting an interviewee who said, “As soon as I got in, I started cutting my wrists,”
and “I figured it was the only way to get out of here”).
104. Id. at 1452.
105. Id.
106. See Grassian, supra note 81, at 337.
107. Id. at 349.
108. See id. at 332; see also Grassian, supra note 101, at 1452.
109. See Grassian, supra note 81, at 353.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 354.
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psychiatric disorders than those in general population housing.112 The
researchers found that individuals in solitary confinement were at a higher
risk for developing adjustment disorders such as depression and anxiety,
coupled with psychosomatic symptoms.113 Panic attacks, posttraumatic
stress disorder, “chronic hyper-vigilance,” and obsessive thoughts are also
symptomatic.114
In solitary confinement, an individual’s emotional well-being also suffers.
Humans are social creatures,115 and healthy brain functioning thrives on
“social thinking and sensory interpretation.”116 People need “continuous
meaningful contact with the outside world” to function.117 Health and wellbeing improve with access to “close social relationships and rich social
networks,” from which people in solitary confinement are necessarily
restricted.118 Complete isolation, in many ways, can be worse than negative
social interaction.119
People who are isolated can suffer a great deal of emotional damage,
cycling between “bitterness and despair.”120 They feel like incarceration is
trying to “break” them and “describe a complete loss of control over their
emotions.”121 Stemming from these thoughts, they also feel a tremendous
amount of rage, resentment, and hopelessness.122
Dr. Craig Haney identified five social pathologies that emerge from
isolation: dependence on the institution, inability to initiate behavior, a
pervading “feeling of unreality,” frustration and anger, and social
withdrawal,.123 Solitary confinement can also cause regression into primary
112. H.S. Andersen et al., A Longitudinal Study of Prisoners on Remand: Psychiatric
Prevalence, Incidence and Psychopathology in Solitary vs. Non-Solitary Confinement, 102
ACTA PSYCHIATRICA SCANDINAVICA 19, 23 (2000) (finding that solitary confinement is “a
significant risk factor for the development of non-psychotic psychiatric morbidity in
comparison with imprisonment in [general population]”).
113. Id.
114. See Jacob Zoghlin, Punishments in Penal Institutions: (Dis)-Proportionality in
Isolation, 21 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 24, 26 (2014).
115. Bandy X. Lee & Maya Prabhu, A Reflection on the Madness in Prisons, 26 STAN. L.
& POL’Y REV. 253, 260 (2015) (“Isolation can be more harmful than negative human contact
because human beings are neurologically and psychologically social animals. Social contact
is like oxygen or food: we do not notice how essential it is until we have known suffocation
or hunger.”).
116. See Elizabeth Bennion, Banning the Bing: Why Extreme Solitary Confinement Is
Cruel and Far Too Unusual Punishment, 90 IND. L.J. 741, 755 (2015).
117. See Benjamin & Lux, supra note 69, at 270.
118. See Lane Beckes & James A. Coan, Social Baseline Theory: The Role of Social
Proximity in Emotion and Economy of Action, 5 SOC. & PERSONALITY PSYCHOL. COMPASS
976, 976 (2011); see also Abdul Rashid et al., The Influence of Social Support on Cognitive
Impairment in the Elderly, 9 AUSTRALIAN MED. J. 262, 264 (2016) (finding that a lack of social
support is a risk factor for cognitive heath and that “[e]lderly with good social support . . . are
less likely to experience cognitive decline”).
119. See Lee & Prabhu, supra note 115, at 259 (“Still, negative human contact within
prisons is better than no contact.”).
120. See Benjamin & Lux, supra note 69, at 277.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Craig Haney, Mental Health Issues in Long-Term Solitary and “Supermax”
Confinement, 49 CRIME & DELINQ. 124, 138–40 (2003).
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processes, consisting of “unrealistic, prelogical modes of thought, or
[thoughts] which contain[] inappropriate drive intrusions.”124 Consistent
with this regression are a lack of impulse control, fantasies of revenge, and
paranoia.125
Solitary confinement also impacts sensitivity to external stimuli. One’s
attention to the environment and levels of alertness are diminished during
isolation.126 Those who are isolated may lose “perceptual constancy,”
characterized by “objects becoming larger and smaller, seeming to ‘melt’ or
change form, [and] sounds becoming louder and softer.”127 In addition, they
demonstrate an extreme hypersensitivity to stimuli, which “become[]
intensely unpleasant,” and report that “small irritations become
maddening.”128
Further, the effects of solitary confinement are physical. Solitary
confinement can be “as strong a risk factor for . . . mortality as are smoking,
obesity, a sedentary lifestyle, and high blood pressure.”129 Solitary
confinement also causes “sleep disturbances, headaches, lethargy, dizziness,
heart palpitations, appetite loss, weight loss, severe digestive problems,
diaphoresis, back and joint pain, deterioration of eyesight, shaking and
feeling cold, and aggravation of pre-existing medical problems.”130
The harm of solitary confinement is often permanent, even if symptoms
subside over time after one’s release.131 This can have implications for
successful reentry to society.132 In fact, prolonged isolation can cause lasting
detrimental emotional damage and, in the worst cases, permanent “functional
disability.”133 Harms associated with solitary confinement can become
permanent even after a short duration.134
Immediately after release from segregation, whether into general
population housing or society, individuals demonstrate difficulties with
adjustment.135 Solitary confinement can thus have a negative impact on
public safety. Jails, pretrial detention in particular, are designed for shortterm incarceration.136 The majority of people incarcerated pretrial will be
released, and they will not be “well prepared to return to a social milieu.”137

124. See Benjamin & Lux, supra note 69, at 275.
125. Grassian, supra note 101, at 1453.
126. See Grassian, supra note 81, at 330.
127. Id. at 337.
128. Id. at 331.
129. Bennion, supra note 116, at 755.
130. Zoghlin, supra note 114, at 26.
131. See Grassian, supra note 81, at 332.
132. See Gordon, supra note 70, at 506–07.
133. Terry A. Kupers, What to Do with the Survivors?: Coping with the Long-Term Effects
of Isolated Confinement, 35 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 1005, 1006 (2008).
134. See Méndez, supra note 16, at 23 (stating that even a short duration in isolation can
amount to torture).
135. Kupers, supra note 133, at 1010.
136. See, e.g., PETTERUTI & WALSH, supra note 47, at 5 (“[J]ails are intended to hold people
who are at risk of reoffending, are unlikely to return for their court date, and/or are sentenced
to a year or less.”).
137. Kupers, supra note 133, at 1011.
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The permanence of the harm and the likelihood that individuals will
develop psychiatric disorders render emerging adults especially vulnerable
to the practice. Further, emerging adults are the most likely age demographic
to be exposed to solitary confinement in jail.138
In his call to “banish” solitary confinement for juveniles in the United
States, Professor Ian M. Kysel “suggest[s] that there are both practical and
jurisprudential reasons for viewing children as different from adults when it
comes to evaluating how the constitution protects them when they are
deprived of their liberty” while incarcerated.139 The following section,
through a discussion of the empirical research surrounding emerging
adulthood, demonstrates that there are similar practical and jurisprudential
reasons to view emerging adults differently.
C. Emerging Adulthood:
A Critical Developmental Period
With some exceptions, legal adulthood begins at the age of eighteen in the
United States.140 However, many scholars reject the designation of eighteen
as a marker of adulthood.141 Eighteen as legal adulthood is simply a default
rule “unless the legislatures or courts have prescribed a higher or lower age
in particular contexts.”142
The age of responsibility depends on the context. For example, in most
states, foster care and parental support obligations end at the age of eighteen,
but health insurance plans are mandated under parents’ health insurance
coverage until the age of twenty-six.143 Between the ages of fourteen and
sixteen, adolescents are able to make autonomous medical decisions, but
alcohol consumption is prohibited until twenty-one.144 The age of criminal
responsibility is eighteen in most states but can be as low as sixteen or
seventeen in others.145
Strict dividing lines are undoubtedly easier to enforce, but they ignore “the
reality of human development, which occurs on a continuum.”146 Between
the ages of eighteen and twenty-five, individuals are likely to experience
more instability and unpredictability than those in different age groups.147

138. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
139. Ian M. Kysel, Banishing Solitary: Litigating an End to the Solitary Confinement of
Children in Jails and Prisons, 40 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 675, 679 (2016).
140. See Atwell, supra note 25, at 15.
141. See Melissa S. Caulum, Comment, Postadolescent Brain Development: A Disconnect
Between Neuroscience, Emerging Adults, and the Corrections System, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 729,
732; see also David P. Farrington et al., Young Adult Offenders: The Need for More Effective
Legislative Options and Justice Processing, 11 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 729, 730 (2012).
142. Alexandra O. Cohen et al., When Does a Juvenile Become an Adult?: Implications
for Law and Policy, 88 TEMP. L. REV. 769, 770 (2016).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 776.
145. See Kysel, supra note 139, at 681.
146. See Atwell, supra note 25, at 15.
147. Id. at 19.
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1. Defining Emerging Adulthood
Dr. Jeffrey Jensen Arnett identifies the period from adolescence through
the twenties as a distinct stage of maturation.148 He argues that emerging
adulthood is “theoretically and empirically distinct from” both adolescence
and young adulthood, characterized by increased risk-taking.149 He also
justifies defining emerging adulthood as a distinct developmental stage rather
than a transitional period by indicating that seven years is a longer period
than both infancy and adolescence.150
Professor David Farrington and his colleagues look to justifications for
treating juveniles as a protected, separate group to justify similarly protecting
emerging adults. Emerging adults, while distinct in many ways, are more
similar to adolescents “with respect to features such as their executive
functioning, impulse control, malleability, responsibility, susceptibility to
peer influence, and adjudicative competence.”151 Results show that collegeaged individuals may be more similar to adolescents than older adults in their
inclination to engage in “antisocial decision making.”152 These similarities
justify treating emerging adults as a distinct midway group deserving of
increased legal protection.153
Some disagree with the calls for increased protection. Professor John
Lunstroth, for example, argues that the law should recognize formal, legal
adulthood as early as fourteen.154 He is worried that arguments in favor of
treating youth as less culpable could be damaging for the variety of rights
youth should be entitled to in other contexts.155
In the seminal case Roper v. Simmons156—which declared the death
penalty unconstitutional when imposed on youth under the age of eighteen—
Justice Antonin Scalia dissented and was similarly perplexed by the
disconnect among youth advocates.157 Justice Scalia pointed to the American
Psychiatric Association’s brief in Roper—supporting a finding of diminished
criminal liability for those who are under eighteen—as inconsistent with a
prior brief in support of declaring youth under eighteen as competent to make
decisions about obtaining an abortion.158
148. Jeffrey Jensen Arnett, Emerging Adulthood: A Theory of Development from the Late
Teens Through the Twenties, 55 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 469, 469 (2000).
149. Id. at 469–75.
150. Jeffrey Jensen Arnett, Emerging Adulthood: What Is It, and What Is It Good For?, 1
CHILD DEV. PERSP. 68, 70 (2007).
151. See Farrington et al., supra note 141, at 741.
152. Kathryn Lynn Modecki, Addressing Gaps in the Maturity of Judgment Literature:
Age Differences and Delinquency, 32 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 78, 89 (2008) (researching a
sample population of adolescents aged fourteen to seventeen, college-aged people eighteen to
twenty-one, young adults twenty-two to twenty-seven, and adults twenty-eight to forty).
153. See Farrington et al., supra note 141, at 730.
154. John Lunstroth, Recognizing Younger Citizens: Statutes and Structures in Support of
Earlier Adulthood, 18 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 161, 164 (2014).
155. Id. (discussing a child’s ability to make decisions in relation to terminal illnesses,
ability to vote, etc.).
156. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
157. Id. at 617–18 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
158. Id.
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These seemingly incompatible arguments cease to be incompatible when
emerging adulthood research is consulted.159 Developmental change
depends on the outcome being assessed.160 For example, people “mature
intellectually before they mature emotionally or socially,” with emotional
and social maturation extending past the age of eighteen.161
This Note does not argue that youth should not have the right to be
independent agents. Rather, it argues that emerging adults should not be
subjected to a practice, especially absent a formal finding of guilt, that has
demonstrated severe and permanent negative effects. This argument is based
on the evidence that emerging adults will often act rashly and take risks.162
In other words, the argument is not that adolescents and emerging adults are
wholly incapable of thinking for themselves and making their own decisions
in all circumstances but that we should be concerned about how they are to
be held accountable.
2. Increased Risk-Taking
Emerging adults are more likely than both adolescents and older adults to
engage in risky behavior.163 Rather than conceptualizing the age of eighteen
as a marker of the end of an unstable developmental period, eighteen is more
appropriate as the marker of the “beginning of a particularly problematic
developmental phase.”164 The evidence that risk-taking actually peaks
during emerging adulthood then begins to desist weakens the argument that
eighteen-year-olds are embarking on a period of increased sensibility.165
In one study, researchers found that most risky behaviors decrease from
adolescence to adulthood, but the age at which they decline differs.166 While
desistance from offending is typically related to the age of onset of criminal
behavior, the early twenties mark the largest concentration of desisting

159. Laurence Steinberg et al., Are Adolescents Less Mature Than Adults?: Minors’ Access
to Abortion, the Juvenile Death Penalty, and the Alleged APA “Flip-Flop,” 64 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 583, 586 (2009).
160. Elizabeth S. Scott et al., Young Adulthood as a Transitional Legal Category: Science,
Social Change, and Justice Policy, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 641, 648–49 (2016).
161. Id. at 648.
162. See infra Part I.C.2.
163. See Krisna N.K. Duangpatra et al., Variables Affecting Emerging Adults’ SelfReported Risk and Reckless Behaviors, 30 J. APPLIED DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 298, 298
(2009); see also Brandon G. Bergman et al., “The Age of Feeling In-Between”: Addressing
Challenges in the Treatment of Emerging Adults with Substance Use Disorders, 23 COGNITIVE
& BEHAV. PRAC. 270, 271 (2016) (finding that emerging adults have the highest rates of
substance use disorders of any age group).
164. Elizabeth Cauffman, Aligning Justice System Processing with Developmental Science,
11 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 751, 752 (2012); see also Jeffrey J. Arnett et al., The New Life
Stage of Emerging Adulthood at Ages 18–29 Years: Implications for Mental Health, 1 LANCET
PSYCHIATRY 569, 571 (2014) (“Emerging adulthood is arguably the most unstable period of
the lifespan.”).
165. See Cauffman, supra note 164, at 752.
166. See Jeannette Brodbeck et al., Comparing Growth Trajectories of Risk Behaviors from
Late Adolescence Through Young Adulthood: An Accelerated Design, 49 DEVELOPMENTAL
PSYCHOL. 1732, 1737 (2013).
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regardless of the age of onset.167 By the midtwenties, approximately threequarters of all people who engage in criminal behavior are expected to stop
engaging in such behavior altogether.168
Self-control theory’s basic thesis is that the absence of self-control leads
to criminal behavior.169 Researchers are increasingly finding that selfcontrol continues to change and develop into emerging adulthood.170
Evidence of increased risk-taking among unincarcerated youth is a sign that
the inherent stressors of incarceration could lead emerging adults to engage
in the types of behaviors that may eventually cause their placement in solitary
confinement.
In a study of prison violence, researchers found that incarcerated people
under the age of twenty-one were 3.5 times as likely to engage in violence,
and people between the ages of twenty-one and twenty-five were 63 percent
more likely to engage in violence than those between the ages of thirty-one
and thirty-five.171 As age increases, people who are incarcerated are less
likely to engage in violent behavior.172
Professor Barbara Bennett Woodhouse cautions that the theory of
emerging adulthood, encompassing identity exploration and risk-taking, is a
privilege that only the middle and upper classes can enjoy.173 The increased
vulnerabilities of emerging adulthood among those who do not have that
privilege are similarly intensified during incarceration and solitary
confinement. Emerging adulthood is typically “characterized by myriad
opportunities for greater autonomy and independent living that comes with
reaching the age of majority.”174 Incarcerated emerging adults are
necessarily foreclosed from this period of exploration because “‘growing up’
[incarcerated] creates a developmental bind.”175 It is imperative that they are
not left behind.

167. See Farrington et al., supra note 141, at 734.
168. Andrew Michaels, A Decent Proposal: Exempting Eighteen-to-Twenty-Year-Olds
from the Death Penalty, 40 N.Y.U REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 139, 164 (2016).
169. Callie H. Burt et al., Self-Control Through Emerging Adulthood: Instability,
Multidimensionality, and Criminological Significance, 52 CRIMINOLOGY 450, 453–54 (2014).
170. Id. at 474.
171. Allison M. Schenk & William J. Fremouw, Individual Characteristics Related to
Prison Violence: A Critical Review of the Literature, 17 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 430,
432 (2012).
172. Id.
173. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Youthful Indiscretions: Culture, Class Status, and the
Passage to Adulthood, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 743, 758 (2002).
174. See Bergman et al., supra note 163, at 270.
175. Joyce A. Arditti & Tiffaney Parkman, Young Men’s Reentry After Incarceration: A
Developmental Paradox, 60 FAM. REL. 205, 207, 215 (2011) (“Young adults who ‘grow up’
in prison are severely restricted in terms of having the opportunity and freedom to explore
positive life directions, master social competence, and establish themselves in social structures
necessary for status attainment.”).
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3. Increased Vulnerability to Negative Conditions
Emerging adulthood is a challenge for “even the most well-adjusted
youth.”176 Incarcerated emerging adults “have yet to establish conventional
social ties, roles, and activities prior to their incarceration.”177 A failure to
successfully navigate this developmental period can have lifelong effects.178
Additionally, emerging adults are at a heightened risk for developing mental
illnesses.179 Prevalence of a mental health disorder for individuals aged
eighteen to twenty-nine is higher than any other age group.180
Evidence suggests that stressful environments may actually be regressive.
Youth aged eighteen to twenty-one behave more like adolescents when
exposed to “negative emotional arousal.”181 Further, an emerging adult’s
cognitive functioning is especially “vulnerable to negative emotional
influences.”182 During emerging adulthood, individuals begin to develop and
acquire both practical and interpersonal skills that will enable them to
navigate adulthood more effectively. Incarceration during this critical period
in itself disrupts this development; solitary confinement will unmistakably
aggravate this disruption.
II. PUNISHMENT: A TERM OF ART
The Supreme Court has stated, “Prison walls do not form a barrier
separating prison inmates from the protections of the Constitution.”183 In
keeping with this assertion, the Court has attempted to define the contours of
the rights afforded to people who are incarcerated. The Court held that the
Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause applies only to
people who are incarcerated following a conviction.184 Until 2015, there was
no clear dividing line between standards applicable to pretrial incarceration
and imprisonment.185
Part II.A outlines the development of the Supreme Court’s prison
jurisprudence, and Part II.B similarly tracks the development of the Supreme
Court’s pretrial incarceration jurisprudence.186
While Kingsley v.
Hendrickson187 held that claims of excessive force in pretrial detention are

176. See Zajac et al., supra note 27, at 139.
177. See Arditti & Parkman, supra note 175, at 205.
178. See id.; see also Zajac et al., supra note 27, at 140 (“The importance of this
developmental period lies not only in key milestones but also in the risk for impediments.”).
179. See Zajac et al., supra note 27, at 140 (finding that a “majority of mental health
disorders have onset by the early 20s”); see also Lee & Prabhu, supra note 115, at 262 (finding
that “schizophrenia and bipolar disorder[] most often have their onset during adolescence or
early adulthood”).
180. See Arnett et al., supra note 164, at 569.
181. See Cohen et al., supra note 142, at 786.
182. Id. at 787.
183. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987).
184. City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 243–44 (1983).
185. Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466 (2015).
186. Id.
187. 135 S. Ct. 2466 (2015).
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subject to an objective rather than subjective test,188 it is still unclear whether
the Kingsley test is applicable in other contexts and factual circumstances.189
Part II.C explains lower courts’ conflation of pretrial incarceration and
imprisonment claims prior to Kingsley and demonstrates the risk that this
conflation will continue if Kingsley’s holding is confined to its facts.
A. The Eighth Amendment and Imprisonment
The Court repeatedly grounds its prison jurisprudence on the fact that the
complainants have been convicted of a crime.190 Additionally, the Court
continually emphasizes a rigorous deference to prison administrators.191 The
Court concretized this deference in Turner v. Safley.192 The majority was
wary of the competing interests of protecting the rights of incarcerated
individuals and exercising judicial restraint.193 For this reason, the Court
articulated the following standard: “[W]hen a prison regulation impinges on
inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related
to legitimate penological interests.”194 While there must be a logical
connection between the regulation that curtails fundamental rights and its
stated goals,195 the Court also reinforced the suggestion that prison officials
are experts who should have the latitude to make decisions qualified by that
expertise.196
The Supreme Court, mindfully exercising restraint, developed its
jurisprudence to safeguard the rights of people who are incarcerated
postconviction so that they are not subjected to cruel and unusual
punishment. Today, prison officials must act with subjective deliberate
indifference to a person’s health or safety to be found liable.197 Further,
solitary confinement in itself does not trigger a protected liberty interest
unless it amounts to an “atypical, significant deprivation.”198

188. Id. at 2475 (emphasizing that respondents’ assertion that the applicable standard
should be subjective fails due to their reliance on Eighth Amendment jurisprudence).
189. See id. at 2473 (maintaining that the objective standard should not be applied
“mechanically”).
190. See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 561–63 (1974) (referencing lawful
conviction status as a justification for the articulated procedural protections).
191. See, e.g., supra note 82 and accompanying text.
192. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
193. Id. at 84–85.
194. Id. at 89.
195. Id. at 89–91 (maintaining that the goals must be objective but that courts can also take
account of whether there are other avenues for complainants to assert constitutional rights,
whether allowing a complainant to assert those rights will have a “ripple effect” on others, and
whether there are “ready alternatives” to the regulation).
196. See id. at 84–85 (“Running a prison is an inordinately difficult undertaking that
requires expertise.”); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974) (deferring to the
“professional expertise of corrections officials”).
197. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
198. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 486 (1995).
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1. Culpable State of Mind:
Subjective Deliberate Indifference
The Supreme Court first presented the subjective deliberate indifference
standard in a claim alleging unconstitutionally inadequate medical care.199
The Court found that the Eighth Amendment “proscribes more than
physically barbarous punishments” and extends an obligation to the
government to “provide medical care for those whom it is punishing by
incarceration.”200 The Court found an affirmative duty in the prison context
because people who are incarcerated cannot turn elsewhere for medical
care.201 Accidents and “inadvertent failure[s]” to provide care, however, will
not constitute violations of the Eighth Amendment, despite the level of pain
and suffering that might ensue as a result.202 The Court emphasized that
officials may not be found liable for mere negligence.203
The Court additionally refused to distinguish between short-term
conditions of confinement and “systemic” conditions.204 In Wilson v.
Seiter,205 the plaintiff alleged that one-time conditions should have a culpable
state of mind requirement but in continuous conditions, a prison official’s
state of mind should be irrelevant.206 In response, the Supreme Court wrote:
We perceive neither a logical nor a practical basis for that distinction. The
source of the intent requirement is not the predilections of this Court, but
the Eighth Amendment itself, which bans only cruel and unusual
punishment. If the pain inflicted is not formally meted out as punishment
by the statute or the sentencing judge, some mental element must be
attributed to the inflicting officer before it can qualify.207

The Court thus reiterated that a subjective inquiry is required in cases alleging
unconstitutional conditions of confinement.208
The Court was once again tasked with answering whether the deliberate
indifference standard is objective or subjective in a failure-to-protect
claim.209 Dee Farmer—a transgender woman who was sometimes housed in
general population with cisgender men but more often segregated—brought
a civil suit alleging deliberately indifferent failure to protect her from
harm.210 Within two weeks of a transfer to general population in March of
1989, Farmer was physically and sexually assaulted by another incarcerated

199. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835 (noting that the term “deliberate indifference” was first used
in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976)).
200. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102–03.
201. Id. at 103.
202. Id. at 105–06 (“Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely
because the victim is a prisoner.”).
203. Id. at 106.
204. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 300–01 (1991).
205. 501 U.S. 294 (1991).
206. Id. at 300.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 301–03.
209. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
210. Id. at 829–32.
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person in her cell.211 Farmer’s complaint alleged that she was placed in
general population housing despite the officers’ knowledge of the violent
environment and history of assault and despite knowledge that her
appearance and gender identity would make her especially vulnerable.212
The Supreme Court conceded that officials have a duty to ensure that those
in their care are protected from violence at the hands of other people who are
incarcerated.213 However, not every injury suffered at the hands of another
constitutes a violation of the Eighth Amendment.214 The Court established a
two-part test: the alleged deprivation “must be, objectively, ‘sufficiently
serious’” and the official alleged to have caused the deprivation must be
subjectively deliberately indifferent to the individual’s health or safety.215
The Court rejected Farmer’s contention that deliberate indifference is a
solely objective test.216 The Court instead held that “a prison official cannot
be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane
conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an
excessive risk to inmate health or safety.”217 The Court did not hold that the
official must know that harm is inevitable.218 A failure to act despite
“knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm” suffices to satisfy
deliberate indifference.219
2. Solitary Confinement in the Context of Prison Discipline:
Liberty and Procedural Due Process
The standards articulated in Estelle v. Gamble220 and Farmer v.
Brennan221 establish rights afforded to incarcerated people in claims arising
out of the conditions of their confinement. During their incarceration,
individuals may also be disciplined for various reasons. The Supreme Court
accords prison officials discretion in discipline and allows them to place
individuals in solitary confinement to “effectuate[] prison management and
prisoner rehabilitative goals.”222
Sandin v. Conner223 is a leading case addressing solitary confinement in
the prison context. In response to disrespectful language directed at an
officer, DeMont Conner was issued a disciplinary infraction and
subsequently sentenced to thirty days in disciplinary segregation.224 Conner

211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

Id. at 830.
Id. at 831.
Id. at 833.
Id. at 834.
Id. (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)).
Id. at 837.
Id.
Id. at 842.
Id.
429 U.S. 97 (1976).
511 U.S. 825 (1994).
Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485 (1995).
515 U.S. 472 (1995).
Id. at 475–76.
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alleged that his segregation encroached on a protected liberty interest.225 The
Supreme Court disagreed, distinguishing the rights of those who are
convicted from those who are incarcerated pretrial.226 The Court found that
“[d]iscipline by prison officials in response to a wide range of misconduct
falls within the expected perimeters of the sentence imposed by a court of
law.”227
The Supreme Court held that liberty interests are triggered by “atypical,
significant deprivation[s].”228 The Court subsequently found that thirty days
in disciplinary segregation did not constitute an atypical and significant
hardship and therefore did not encroach upon Conner’s liberty interests in
violation of the Eighth Amendment.229
To ensure that individuals are not arbitrarily deprived of their liberty, the
Supreme Court outlined minimum procedural protections in Wolff v.
McDonnell.230 The Court justified its holding on the basis of the
complainant’s criminal conviction. The Court wrote: “Prison disciplinary
proceedings . . . take place in a closed, tightly controlled environment
peopled by those who have chosen to violate the criminal law and who have
been lawfully incarcerated for doing so.”231
Additionally, the Court acknowledged the often tense relationship between
people who are incarcerated and prison staff.232 To balance the competing
interests of ensuring that individuals are not arbitrarily disciplined and
allowing officials to effectively manage their facilities and people in their
custody, the Court established that individuals who are charged with a
disciplinary infraction are entitled to a hearing prior to being sanctioned.233
The Court outlined the following additional minimum protections: the
individual is entitled to written notice, time to prepare for a disciplinary
hearing (no less than twenty-four hours), a written statement by the factfinders communicating the reasons for the infraction, and the right to call
witnesses should the hearing administrator determine that doing so will not
be “unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals.”234 An

225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

Id. at 484.
Id. at 484–85.
Id. at 485.
Id. at 486.
Id. at 487.
418 U.S. 539 (1974).
Id. at 561.
Id. at 562.
Id. at 557–58.
Id. at 564–66.
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individual facing disciplinary charges has no right to counsel235 and no right
to cross-examine witnesses.236
All of the above cases were decided with the explicit acknowledgment that
the complainants were lawfully incarcerated pursuant to a conviction.
Consequently, their application to claims brought by individuals who are
incarcerated pretrial should be avoided.
B. Substantive Due Process and Pretrial Incarceration
The Supreme Court’s deference to prison administrators is clear.237 The
Court is similarly deferential to jail administrators.238 In a series of cases,
the Court, articulating and fine-tuning the standard applicable to people who
are incarcerated pretrial, maintained that administrators are similarly best
suited to make security and other considerations.239
The touchstone of the Supreme Court’s pretrial incarceration jurisprudence
is the doctrine of substantive due process. Embedded in the right to “due
process of law”240 is the notion that adequate process can safeguard
individuals from arbitrary government action.241 The Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments guarantee individuals the right to “due process of law,” which
appears to guarantee “only procedural protection.”242 However, the Due
Process Clause also contains a substantive element.243 Individuals have the
right to be free from arbitrary government action “regardless of the fairness
of the procedures used to implement them.”244

235. Id. at 570 (“The insertion of counsel into the disciplinary process would inevitably
give the proceedings a more adversary cast and tend to reduce their utility as a means to further
correctional goals. There would also be delay and very practical problems in providing
counsel in sufficient numbers at the time and place where hearings are to be held. At this stage
of the development of these procedures we are not prepared to hold that inmates have a right
to either retained or appointed counsel in disciplinary proceedings.”).
236. Id. at 567 (“Confrontation and cross-examination present greater hazards to
institutional interests. If confrontation and cross-examination of those furnishing evidence
against the inmate were to be allowed as a matter of course, as in criminal trials, there would
be considerable potential for havoc inside the prison walls. Proceedings would inevitably be
longer and tend to unmanageability.”).
237. See Struve, supra note 39, at 1015.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law . . . .”); id. amend. XIV (“No state shall . . . deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”).
241. See Rosalie Berger Levinson, Protection Against Government Abuse of Power: Has
the Court Taken the Substance out of Substantive Due Process, 16 U. DAYTON L. REV. 313,
313 (1991) (“Although on its face, the due process clause appears to assure only procedural
protection, the United States Supreme Court has long recognized that the clause contains a
substantive element as well.”).
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331–32 (1986); see also Ingraham v. Wright, 430
U.S. 651, 672–73 (1977) (“The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, later
incorporated into the Fourteenth, was intended to give Americans at least the protection
against governmental power that they had enjoyed as Englishmen against the power of the
Crown. The liberty preserved from deprivation without due process included the right
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1. The Right to Be Free from Punishment:
Bell v. Wolfish and Its Progeny
In 1979, the Supreme Court decided Bell v. Wolfish,245 the seminal case
legally differentiating between people who are incarcerated awaiting
resolution of their cases and those who are incarcerated following a
conviction.246 People incarcerated pretrial at the Metropolitan Correction
Center—a federal jail in New York—brought a class action challenging the
conditions of their confinement.247
The Supreme Court noted that the government’s interest in detaining
individuals prior to trial is legitimate and not at issue in deciding conditions
of confinement claims.248 The Court held that the issue in such cases “is the
detainee’s right to be free from punishment.”249 The prevailing standard is
whether conditions complained of amount to punishment “in the
constitutional sense.”250 The Court elaborated that “[n]ot every disability
imposed during pretrial detention” will amount to unconstitutional
punishment.251
Courts must determine whether the disability complained of has a punitive
purpose or whether it is related to a reasonable governmental interest.252
Absent an express intent to punish, a regulation, procedure, or policy may be
considered punitive if there is no rationally related purpose or if it “appears
excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned [to it].”253 One
legitimate interest that the Supreme Court stresses is a jail’s interest in
maintaining order and security.254
The standard, as articulated in Bell, was vague, and the lack of a precise
dividing line between constitutional and unconstitutional conditions of
confinement in pretrial detention “provided few details to guide future
cases.”255 In 1984, the Court reiterated that the articulated right to be free
from punishment is qualified by great deference to jail administrators.256 A
jail’s denial of contact visits even to people who are low risk was considered
a legitimate and reasonable interest in light of the risk of smuggling
contraband and the risk of harm to innocent visitors.257 Additionally, the

‘generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men.’” (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923))).
245. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
246. Id.
247. Id. at 523–24.
248. Id. at 533–34.
249. Id. at 534.
250. Id. at 537.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 538.
253. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144,
168–69 (1963)).
254. Id. at 540. The use of solitary confinement is often rationalized as a method necessary
to ensure jail security. See supra Part I.B.
255. See Struve, supra note 39, at 1015–18.
256. Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 591 (1984).
257. Id. at 586.
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Court decided that the practice of conducting cell searches while individuals
are away from their cells does not violate due process.258
The Supreme Court did not address another pretrial detention conditionof-confinement claim until 2012 in Florence v. Board of Chosen
Freeholders.259 The Court, once again deferring to administrators, upheld a
jail’s practice of strip-searching newly admitted individuals.260
2. Kingsley v. Hendrickson:
Pretrial Incarceration’s Objective Standard
Kingsley is the most recent case addressing the rights of people in pretrial
detention. The complainant, Michael Kingsley, alleged that he was the
victim of excessive force.261 Some facts were disputed, but all parties agreed
that Sergeant Hendrickson placed his knee in Kingsley’s back (while he was
still handcuffed), that Kingsley impolitely told him to get off, and that Deputy
Sheriff Degner tased Kingsley.262
The Court faced the following issue: Must a plaintiff prove an officer’s
culpable state of mind to prove that the officer’s use of force amounted to
unconstitutional punishment?263 The Court held that a plaintiff is not
required to prove an officer’s state of mind to succeed.264 According to the
Court, a person who is incarcerated pretrial “must show only that the force
purposely or knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable.”265
The Supreme Court clarified Bell’s holding, explaining that objective
evidence alone is sufficient to establish that an official act is not “rationally
related to a legitimate governmental objective or that it is excessive in
Additionally, the Court affirmatively
relation to that purpose.”266
distinguished between excessive force claims brought by those who are
incarcerated postconviction and those who are incarcerated pretrial.267 In
doing so, the Court emphasized that people who are incarcerated pretrial
“cannot be punished at all, much less ‘maliciously and sadistically.’”268
Continuing in its tradition of deference to administrators, the Court wrote
that the objective reasonableness consideration is fact specific.269 Thus, this
holding does not categorically apply to all types of claims brought by people
who are incarcerated pretrial. There is still a risk that circuit courts, even
after Kingsley, may continue to apply standards established in the prison
context to the pretrial context.

258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

Id. at 589–92.
132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012).
Id. at 1523.
Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2470 (2015).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2472.
Id. at 2473.
Id. at 2473–74.
Id. at 2475.
Id. (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671 n.40 (1977)).
Id. at 2473.
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C. Applying the Objective Standard to Other Factual Circumstances:
Kingsley’s Fact-Specific Nature
Citing Bell, the Supreme Court found that the rights of individuals who
have been injured in the course of an arrest “are at least as great as the Eighth
Amendment protections available to” a person who is incarcerated following
a conviction.270 Following this logic, many circuit courts conflated claims
brought by people who are incarcerated regardless of their conviction
status.271
Prior to Kingsley, the First,272 Fourth,273 Sixth,274 Eighth,275 Ninth,276 and
Tenth277 Circuits treated claims brought by incarcerated people the same
regardless of conviction. Illustrative of the risk that this conflation may
continue in claims that do not allege excessive use of force is Ruiz-Bueno v.
Scott.278 Ruiz-Bueno was decided shortly after Kingsley but applied
Farmer’s subjective deliberate indifference standard.279
The Sixth Circuit found that people who are incarcerated pretrial are
“protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.”280 Yet, the
court simultaneously held that “Supreme Court precedents governing
prisoners’ Eighth Amendment rights also govern the Fourteenth Amendment
270. City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983).
271. See generally Struve, supra note 39; see also David C. Gorlin, Note, Evaluating
Punishment in Purgatory: The Need to Separate Pretrial Detainees’ Conditions-ofConfinement Claims from Inadequate Eighth Amendment Analysis, 108 MICH. L. REV 417
(2009).
272. See, e.g., Ford v. Bender, 768 F.3d 15, 24 (1st Cir. 2014); Surprenant v. Rivas, 424
F.3d 5, 18 (1st Cir. 2005) (stating that unconstitutional conditions of confinement alleged by
people who are incarcerated pretrial “implicate[] Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests,”
but the “parameters of such an interest are coextensive with those of the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment”); Collazo-Leon v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons,
51 F.3d 315, 318 (1st Cir. 1995).
273. See, e.g., Hause v. Vaught, 993 F.2d 1079, 1082 (4th Cir. 1993) (“[T]he concern for
security is the same for pretrial detainees as for convicted inmates.”); Hill v. Nicodemus, 979
F.2d 987, 991–92 (4th Cir. 1992).
274. See, e.g., Phillips v. Roane County, 534 F.3d 531, 539–40 (6th Cir. 2008) (applying
Farmer’s subjective deliberate indifference standard to an allegation of inadequate medical
care brought by a person who was incarcerated pretrial).
275. See, e.g., Walton v. Dawson, 752 F.3d 1109, 1117 (8th Cir. 2014) (using Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence to require subjective deliberate indifference in excessive force
cases brought by people who are incarcerated pretrial); Smith v. Copeland, 87 F.3d 265, 269
(8th Cir. 1996) (holding that Smith’s claim that overflowing raw sewage violated his
constitutional rights should be dismissed “whether analyzed under Eighth Amendment or Due
Process jurisprudence”).
276. See, e.g., Pierce v. County of Orange, 526 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 2008); Demery v.
Arpaio, 378 F.3d 1020, 1030 (9th Cir. 2004); Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435,
1441 (9th Cir. 1991).
277. Blackmon v. Sutton, 734 F.3d 1237, 1240 (10th Cir. 2013) (holding that rights
afforded to persons incarcerated pretrial are at least the same as those afforded to persons
incarcerated postconviction).
278. 639 F. App’x 354 (6th Cir. 2016).
279. Id. at 362 (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994)) (writing that the plaintiff’s
argument alleging unconstitutional conditions of confinement “does not square with the
language of Farmer”); see also Bloom v. Pompa, 654 F. App’x 930, 934 (10th Cir. 2016)
(finding that deliberate indifference in the pretrial context mirrors Farmer’s standards).
280. Ruiz-Bueno, 639 F. App’x at 358.
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rights” of people who are incarcerated pretrial.281 Applying Farmer, the
court required that each individual involved in an alleged constitutional
violation must act with subjective deliberate indifference.282
It is possible that the court’s decision was based, at least in part, on the
factual differences between Ruiz-Bueno and Kingsley. Some of the lower
courts have not applied Kingsley to different factual circumstances,
referencing the opinion’s fact-specific language.283 Other courts have
expressed uncertainty over whether Kingsley applies to different
circumstances but declined to make a decision.284
For future claims alleging that isolating emerging adults who are
incarcerated pretrial infringes on a protected liberty interest and is
unconstitutionally punitive, lower courts may be compelled to apply Sandin’s
atypical and significant hardship test. Fortunately, some circuits have already
held that Sandin does not apply to claims brought by people who are
incarcerated pretrial.285 Additionally, the justification in Sandin is explicitly
based on the fact that the complainant was convicted of a crime.286
Wolff may also pose a barrier to successful litigation in this area. The
significant risk of permanent, adverse psychological, emotional, and physical
effects for incarcerated emerging adults and the differentiation between
individuals who are incarcerated pretrial and postconviction warrant a
finding that subjecting emerging adults who are incarcerated pretrial to
solitary confinement is itself objectively unreasonable punishment
proscribed by substantive due process. In other words, this practice is
unconstitutionally punitive “regardless of the fairness of the procedures used
to implement [it].”287
281. Id.
282. Id. at 359.
283. See, e.g., Smith v. Dart, 803 F.3d 304, 309–10 (7th Cir. 2015) (finding that conditionsof-confinement claims are subject to both a subjective and objective inquiry); Thomley v.
Bennett, No. 5:14-cv-73, 2016 WL 498436, at *6–7 (S.D. Ga. Feb. 8, 2016) (declining to apply
Kingsley to a claim alleging unconstitutionally inadequate medical care); Florer v. Hoffman,
No. 15-00308 DKW/RLP, 2015 WL 5768946, at *3–4 (D. Haw. Sept. 29, 2015) (declining to
apply Kingsley to failure-to-protect and inadequate medical care claims); Chyatte v. Missoula
County, No. CV 13-174-M-JCL, 2015 WL 5560253, at *14–15 (D. Mont. Sept. 21, 2015)
(applying Farmer, not Kingsley, to conditions-of-confinement claims). But see Castro v.
County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1069–70 (9th Cir. 2016) (writing that the Kingsley
Court did not clarify whether the articulated standard applies to other claims, but finding that
it logically follows to apply Kingsley to failure-to-protect claims); Abila v. Funk, No. CIV 141002JB/SMV, 2016 WL 7242731, at *40–42 (D.N.M. Nov. 23, 2016) (applying Kingsley’s
objective standard to a conditions-of-confinement claim).
284. See, e.g., Johnson v. Clafton, 136 F. Supp. 3d 838, 844 (E.D. Mich. 2015) (finding
that “it is unclear whether courts should continue to use the Eighth Amendment’s deliberateindifference standard to analyze . . . claims brought by pretrial detainees pursuant to the Due
Process Clause,” and declining to answer because the outcome is the same under both
standards).
285. See, e.g., Stevenson v. Carroll, 495 F.3d 62, 69 n.4 (3d Cir. 2007); Surprenant v. Rivas,
424 F.3d 5, 16–17 (1st Cir. 2005); Mitchell v. Dupnik, 75 F.3d 517, 523–24 (1st Cir. 1996).
286. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485 (1995) (“Discipline by prison officials in
response to a wide range of misconduct falls within the expected perimeters of the sentence
imposed by a court of law.” (emphasis added)).
287. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331–32 (1986).
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III. OBJECTIVELY UNREASONABLE PUNISHMENT:
ISOLATING EMERGING ADULTS IN PRETRIAL DETENTION
The minimal procedural protections in Wolff were based, in part, on the
fact that the complainant was convicted of a crime and subsequently
imprisoned.288 Additionally, these protections are truly minimal, giving rise
to the risk that individuals will be wrongfully disciplined.289 The standard
articulated in Kingsley should thus extend to conditions of confinement
cases.290 The Supreme Court emphasized that jail and prison litigation must
be assessed on a case-by-case basis,291 but it makes practical sense to apply
the same objective standard to the context at issue in this Note.
The Court in Kingsley rested its objective standard on precedent:
We have said that “the Due Process Clause protects a pretrial detainee from
the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment.” And in Bell we
explained that such “punishment” can consist of actions taken with an
“expressed intent to punish.” But the Bell Court went on to explain that, in
the absence of an expressed intent to punish, a pretrial detainee can
nevertheless prevail by showing that the actions are not “rationally related
to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental purpose” or that the actions
“appear excessive in relation to that purpose.” The Bell Court applied this
latter objective standard to evaluate a variety of prison conditions, including
a prison’s practice of double-bunking. In doing so, it did not consider the
prison officials’ subjective beliefs about the policy. Rather, the Court
examined objective evidence.292

Perhaps the most compelling argument in support of finding that the
standard for conditions-of-confinement cases must be objective is Justice
Scalia’s dissent in Kingsley.293 Justice Scalia disagreed that excessive use of
force claims brought by people who are incarcerated pretrial should be
subject to an objective standard.294 He argued that the “reasonable relation”
test established in Bell was limited to challenges of conditions of
confinement.295

288. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 561–63 (1974) (“Prison disciplinary
proceedings . . . take place in a closed, tightly controlled environment peopled by those who
have chosen to violate the criminal law and who have been lawfully incarcerated for doing
so.”).
289. Id. at 582 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the
disciplinary process “will thus amount to little more than a swearing contest, with each side
telling its version of the facts—and, indeed, with only the prisoner’s story subject to being
tested by cross-examination” and that “it seems obvious to me that even the wrongfully
charged inmate will invariably be the loser”).
290. See generally Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2017).
291. Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2473 (2015).
292. Id. (first quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989); then quoting Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 538, 541–43, 561 (1979)).
293. See id. at 2477–79 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
294. Id. at 2478.
295. Id. (“The conditions in which pretrial detainees are held, and the security policies to
which they are subject, are the result of considered deliberation by the authority imposing the
detention. If those conditions and policies lack any reasonable relationship to a legitimate,
nonpunitive goal, it is logical to infer a punitive intent.”).
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According to Justice Scalia, it is more consistent with the Court’s
precedent to apply an objective test to allegations of unconstitutional
conditions of confinement than to allegations of excessive force.296 Given
that the law now only requires an objective inquiry into the punitive nature
of an officer’s use of force,297 it follows that, to be consistent with the Court’s
precedent, the same should apply to pretrial conditions-of-confinement cases.
Consistent with this proposition, the Second Circuit recently found that
Kingsley “altered the standard for deliberate indifference claims under the
Due Process Clause” and extended the Supreme Court’s holding to
conditions-of-confinement claims.298 The court held that in challenging
conditions-of-confinement in pretrial detention, two elements must be met:
the alleged deprivation must be objectively sufficiently serious and the
defendant must act with deliberate indifference.299 The Second Circuit
decided to apply an objective deliberate indifference standard.300
The Second Circuit followed Kingsley and held that the plaintiff does not
have to prove the defendant’s state of mind.301 In particular, the court found:
Unlike a violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, an official
can violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment without
meting out any punishment, which means that the Due Process Clause can
be violated when an official does not have subjective awareness that the
official’s acts (or omissions) have subjected the pretrial detainee to a
substantial risk of harm.302

Other circuits should follow the Second Circuit’s finding that a person who
is incarcerated pretrial “may not be punished at all under the Fourteenth
Amendment, whether through the use of excessive force, by deliberate
indifference to conditions of confinement, or otherwise.”303
The decision to place an individual in solitary confinement is the “result of
considered deliberation by the authority imposing the detention” and is thus
a condition of confinement.304 Looking back to Bell, subjecting emerging
adults to solitary confinement during pretrial detention is excessive in
relation to the governmental purposes assigned to it.305 Whether an emerging
adult is isolated for disciplinary or administrative purposes, the harm is often
irreparable, and the practice has no demonstrated effect on institutional
violence.306 If there is an effect, it is typically that individuals become more

296. Id.
297. Id. at 2473 (majority opinion).
298. Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 30 (2d Cir. 2017).
299. Id.
300. Id. at 32 (noting that “‘deliberate indifference,’ which is roughly synonymous with
‘recklessness,’ can be defined either ‘subjectively’ in a criminal sense, or ‘objectively’ in a
civil sense”).
301. Id.
302. Id. at 35.
303. Id.
304. Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2478 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
305. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 538 (1974).
306. See supra notes 93–97 and accompanying text.
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violent once released from solitary confinement, and institutional violence
may actually increase as a result of the practice.307
Deference to jail administrators in this context does not take account of the
nature of pretrial incarceration and the harm of isolation at such a critical
developmental phase.308 Given that jails are locally (and less) funded and
often cite a lack of funding as a significant issue impeding reform, jail
officials are typically even less qualified and trained than prison officials.309
Such a reality gives weight to Eric Berger’s contention that “[t]he Court’s
deference . . . is premised on institutional grounds without sufficient
examination of the actual institutional practices at issue.”310 Deference based
on the contention that jail staff and administrators are experts simply cannot
be squared with the reality that many of them actually lack the appropriate
expertise necessary to make such judgments.
Because the vast majority of jails operate on the county level,311 advocates
and rulemaking bodies should compel jail administrators to eradicate solitary
confinement for individuals under the age of twenty-five.312 Litigation
challenging the placement of emerging adults in solitary confinement while
they are incarcerated pretrial may also compel localities to eliminate the
practice.313
In the prison context, courts have been reluctant to find psychological
effects of isolated confinement actionable due to their “invisible” nature314
and the subjective prong required in Farmer.315 The same barrier should not
exist in the pretrial context post-Kingsley, where the standard is objective.
In Davis v. Ayala,316 Justice Kennedy critiqued the use of solitary
confinement and wrote: “In a case that presented the issue, the judiciary may
be required, within its proper jurisdiction and authority, to determine whether
workable alternative systems for long-term confinement exist, and, if so,
whether a correctional system should be required to adopt them.”317 The
307. See supra notes 93–97 and accompanying text.
308. See Berger, supra note 77, at 2046 (arguing that “blanket deference to the expertise of
prison officials fails to appreciate that many prisons lack qualified personnel or professional
standards”).
309. See Ruddell & Mays, supra note 49, at 257 (“Jails may be doubly challenged given
their relatively disadvantaged economic position and the fact that the majority are not part of
a correctional network.”).
310. See Berger, supra note 77, at 2046.
311. Jess Maghan, Dangerous Inmates: Maximum Security Incarceration in the State
Prison Systems of the United States, 4 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 1, 1–2 (1999).
312. See, e.g., Michael Winerip & Michael Scwhirtz, Rikers to Ban Isolation for Inmates
21 and Younger, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/14/nyregion/
new-york-city-to-end-solitary-confinement-for-inmates-21-and-under-at-rikers.html [http://
perma.cc/7LVY-4VF3].
313. See Magun, supra note 45, at 2097–98 (“Municipalities have incentives to avoid
§ 1983 lawsuits against their officers . . . and are ultimately responsible for paying damages in
civil rights suits against indemnified officers.”).
314. See, e.g., Christine Rebman, The Eighth Amendment and Solitary Confinement: The
Gap in Protection from Psychological Consequences, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 567, 607–08 (1999).
315. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).
316. 135 S. Ct. 2187 (2015).
317. Id. at 2210 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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intersection of pretrial incarceration and emerging adulthood presents a
compelling argument that courts should abolish the practice of solitary
confinement.
CONCLUSION
The potential for irreversible adverse health effects at the intersection of
solitary confinement and emerging adulthood requires that the rights of
emerging adults who are incarcerated pretrial be safeguarded with urgency.
Isolating emerging adults who are incarcerated pretrial amounts to
unconstitutional punishment. The risk of developing mental illnesses during
emerging adulthood renders placing emerging adults in solitary confinement
a “practice of illness generation.”318
As such, the practice should be abolished and meaningful alternatives to
addressing violence, order, and safety should be put into place. Should they
need to be isolated as a last resort and in response to a violent act, emerging
adults should be isolated only for a “cool-down” period after a consultation
with a mental health professional.319 Additionally, staff who interact
regularly with emerging adults “should receive training on young adult brain
development, and appropriate de-escalation tactics.”320
Such an approach is consistent with the Supreme Court’s customary
caution of balancing the rights of people who are incarcerated and
administrators. Ensuring that emerging adults’ mental, emotional, and
physical health is not damaged allows jail administrators to develop new
practices that both nurture developmental growth and potentially make
people less violent.321
The human cost is also tremendous. People who are incarcerated “retain
the essence of human dignity inherent in all persons.”322 It is time that jails
in the United States work toward ensuring that emerging adults retain their
dignity. As Johnny Perez implores: “For every single day we wait, we risk—
and are—damaging the people who are sitting in those cells. How can we
continue to put people’s humanity on hold?”323

318. See Lee & Prabhu, supra note 115, at 262.
319. While the Department of Justice recommends this practice for juveniles, the same
practice should apply for emerging adults in response to an immediate risk of harm. See U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING THE USE OF RESTRICTIVE
HOUSING 101 (2016), https://www.justice.gov/archives/dag/file/815551/download [https://
perma.cc/M7U3-7P8J]; see also JAMES GILLIGAN & BANDY LEE, REPORT TO THE NEW YORK
CITY BOARD OF CORRECTION (2013), http://nycjac.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/GilliganReport-Final.pdf (“Seclusion should be used only as a last resort when no less restrictive
alternative appears to be capable of preventing violence, and then for only as long as the inmate
appears to continue to represent an immediate or short-term danger to himself or others.”)
[http://perma.cc/6K62-5HD9].
320. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 319, at 102.
321. See id.
322. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1928 (2011).
323. Law, supra note 88.

